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INTRODUCTION
Anarchy - is it the ultimate freedom or the ultimate tyranny? As
the Internet1 comes of age, this question surges toward us. In ex-
panding from global village to global metropolis, the Internet has de-
veloped its own dark alleys and red light districts. Once a haven
exclusively for the military, academicians, and researchers, Internet
users now include hackers,2 thieves, con artists, pedophiles, 3
pornographers,4 hatemongers, and terrorists. 5
The scope of computer abuse has far exceeded the bounds origi-
nally envisioned by legislators, whose fears included only those of
unauthorized access, computer fraud, and alteration of data.6 Is there
an appropriate legislative response that balances freedom from ex-
1. The Internet includes the World Wide Web. The World Wide Web is a portion of the
Internet built on hypertext technology. Robert Atkins, The Art World and I Go On Line, ART IN
AMERICA, Dec. 1995, 58.
2. DrNms LONGLEY & MICHAEL SHAIN, DICTIONARY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 146
(2d ed. 1986) (A "hacker... [is] a computer enthusiast. The term is normally applied to people
who take delight in experimenting with system hardware, software and communication systems.
Sometimes used with the connotation of illegality, especially in reference to unauthorized access
to data.").
3. Wmssmm's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UN.
ABRoGED 1665 (3d ed. 1986) (individuals who have a preference for or addiction to children as
the preferred sexual objects); see Rob Morse, Information Highwaymen, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr.
21, 1994, at A-3.
4. One that produces a depiction of licentiousness and lewdness. WEBSTER'S, supra note
3, at 1767.
5. Carolyn Abraham, Cybercrime: As the Information Highway Grows, So Do the Ter-
rorists, Vandals, Pedophiles and Other Criminals Who Cruise It, VANcoUVER SUN, Apr. 30,
1994, at B5.
6. Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. Rv. 453, 455-56 (1990).
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ploitation against freedom from government intrusion; individual free-
dom and creativity against the need to combat increasing crime?
This comment discusses how the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act7 could be amended to prosecute crimes committed on the Internet.
Part I traces the development of the Internet, highlighting its increas-
ingly dark side. It briefly discusses the current struggle between two
increasingly polarized camps: those who combat crime and those who
defend individual freedom. Part II reviews the evolution of the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act. The impact of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act on noncomputer crimes is discussed in part I. Part IV
discusses proposed amendments to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act to criminalize the use of protected computers to commit crimes or
tortious acts.
I. THE INTERNET
This section describes the development of the Internet and the
status of the Internet today. Coinciding with the Internet's growth has
been an increase in crimes committed on, or facilitated by, the com-
munication facilities provided by the Internet. Currently there is a
struggle between crime control and anarchy in cyberspace. Conse-
quently, many perceive a need for additional legislation.
A. The Development of the Internet
The roots of the Internet are grounded in the Department of De-
fense (DoD). In 1969 the DoD created the Advanced Research Pro-
ject Agency Network (ARPANET).8 This network connected DoD
computers.9 At this time only mainframe computers were part of the
network, and there were a relatively small number of users.
Through the 1980s, the on-line community grew with the advent
of the personal computer. In the mid-1980s, the National Science
Foundation established NSF Net to link a small group of supercom-
puter research centers and researchers at remote academic and govern-
mental institutions.10 Originally intended as a research tool, the
7. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1996).
8. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Liability on the Internet, 3 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1994,
at 3.
9. Gary Anthes, The History of the Future: As the Arpanet Turns 25, Its Founders Reu-
nite to Talk About the Network That Became the Internet, CoMPUTrmwo, .D, Oct. 3, 1994, at
101.
10. Hearing on Internet Access: Subcomm. on Science of the House Committee on Science,
Space and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1994) (statement of Jim Williams, Executive
Director, FARNEr Inc.) [hereinafter Hearing on Internet Access]. See also Raysman & Brown,
supra note 8.
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federal government encouraged universities and research institutions
to use the NSF Net. Connecting the universities turned out to be an
investment. The universities responded by making significant
software contributions, including:
a) Berkeley UNIX (operating system) by University of California
(Berkeley);
b) Mosaic interface (multi-media interface for information re-
trieval) and Eudora (e-mail) by University of Illinois;
c) Gopher (information retrieval tool) by University of Minnesota;
d) Pine (e-mail) by University of Washington; and
e) CU-SeeMe (low-cost video conferencing) by Cornell."
The NSF originally discouraged commercial traffic. 12 However,
by the mid-1980s the Commercial Internet Xchange (CIX)13 circum-
vented these restrictions. Midlevel networks leased data circuits
wholesale from telephone companies and provided them to institutions
on a fixed cost basis. 4 In addition, government contributed an esti-
mated twelve million dollars in annual subsidies to NSF.'5
The number of computers at each node16 and the number of net-
work nodes continued to expand. Over time the network became a
network between networks, or the Internet.
B. The Internet Today
To fully appreciate the legal complexities of regulating the In-
ternet, one must first understand the magnitude of the Internet. The
Internet has an estimated fifteen to twenty-five million users 7 in
ninety-two countries 8 and is growing at the rate of five to eight per-
cent per month.19
Originally designed to connect the disparate computers of the
DoD, connectivity20 still remains the Internet's most unique aspect.2'
11. Hearing on Internet Access, supra note 10, at 129.
12. Raysman & Brown, supra note 8.
13. Peter H. Lewis, Internet for Profit; Businesses Rush to Capitalize on the Internet, 14
No. 11 COMPUTER SHOPPER, Nov. 1994, at 178.
14. Hearing on Internet Access, supra note 10.
15. Raysman & Brown, supra note 8.
16. LONGLEY & SHAiN, supra note 2, at 234 (a node is "a point of interconnection to a
network.").
17. Graene Browning, Net Effects, NAT'L. J., June 3, 1995, § Communications.
18. Internet Crime Soars, IiNo. WK., Oct. 10, 1994, at 20.
19. Joe Clark, The Online Universe: Find Out Why Some 30 Million People Count Them-
selves as Citizens of this Mysterious World, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20, 1994, at J1.
20. FRANK J. GALLAND, DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING: DATA COMMUNICATIONS, HARD-
WARE AND So'rwARE BASICS, DIGITAL ELECTRONICS 50 (1982) ("the ease or practicality of
connecting functional units").
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It features a common telecommunications protocol (TCP/IP),22 which
is now used by most of the computers in the world.23
The most highly-used services offered by the Internet can be
grouped into four categories:
1) fast-changing information: news, sports scores, financial
services;
2) electronic communications: e-mail, real-time conversations,
conferencing;
3) transactional services: banking, shopping travel reservations;
and
4) entertainment: games, horoscopes, movie reviews.24
Current Internet connectivity providers can also be grouped into
four categories:
1) Mom and Pop shops: small businesses, usually with one
location;
2) Regionals: typically nonprofit, university affiliated, subsidized
by the National Science Foundation (NSF);
3) National Independents: for-profit entities, nationwide or interna-
tional services;
4) The Big Guys: IXCS,25 RBOCs, 26 and Cable TV operators.27
When the seeds of the Internet were planted, no one expected its
explosive growth - least of all its developers. Developer Severo Orn-
stein's initial reaction to DoD's request for proposals was: "Sure we
could build such a thing, but I don't see why anybody would want
it."28
The Internet's rapid acceptance was undoubtedly fueled by an
exponential drop in the cost of delivery. In 1987 the cost per
21. Arman Danesh, Servers Are Display of Confidence in Internet, SoUTH CHINA MORN-
IMG Post, Oct. 4, 1994, at 5A.
22. Terminal Control Program/Interet Protocol. MAK S. MERKow, BReaxiNo THROUGH
TECHNICAL JARGON: A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER AND AUTOMATION ACRONYMS 132 (1990).
23. Katie Hafner, Profile; For 'Father of the Internet,' New Goals, Same Energy, N.Y.
TIraEs, Sept. 25, 1994, § 3, at 4.
24. Raysman & Brown, supra note 8.
25. Interexchange channels. JERRY M. RosENBFRG, MCGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF IN-
FORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND COMPUTER ACRONYMS, INITIALS, AND ABBREVIATIONS 88 (1992)
(for example, AT&T, MCI, Sprint).
26. Regional Bell Operating Companies. Id. at 149 (the regional telephone companies
created after the breakup of AT&T).
27. Hearing on Internet Access, supra note 10, at 119 (statement of William L. Schrader,
Chairman, President, and CEO, Performance Systems International Inc.).
28. Anthes, supra note 9.
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megabyte29 (MB) was ten dollars. Two years later that figure dropped
to one dollar. By 1993 it had dropped again to thirteen cents.30
C. Anarchy on the Internet
Fearing that the network would be vulnerable to attack, the
ARPANET, the Internet's predecessor, was intentionally designed
with no central authority.31 NSF Net continued that philosophy. This
lack of control caused one reporter in Britain to comment:
[D]espite its size, Internet is not actually owned or controlled by
anyone. Its roots lie in liberal US academic institutions, and free-
dom of speech and an 'anything goes' credo are important parts of
the Internet ethos.32
While the FCC says it has authority to regulate public computer
networks, it has not yet exercised any control over the Internet.33
Consequently, no central regulatory body governs the Internet. The
one guiding force, the NSF, is withdrawing from active participation
as the Internet evolves commercially. 34
Most Internet users enjoy the anarchy of the Internet. For exam-
ple, Eric Schmidt, Chief Technology Officer of Sun Microsystems,
has great hope in the free-wheeling nature of the Internet, which he
likens to the Wild West.35 He welcomes the commercialization of the
Internet and feels that it will contribute to its breadth. 36
In testifying before the House Subcommittee on Science, William
L. Schrader, Chairman, President, and CEO of Performance Systems
International, Inc., echoed these sentiments. Schrader feels that com-
mercial providers continually improve the quality of the Internet. Like
Schmidt, Schrader welcomes the commercialization of the Internet.37
Despite the optimism in the commercial sector, the federal gov-
ernment is well aware that there is a growing dark side to the Internet.
29. JERRY M. RosENBERG, DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS, INFORMATION PROCESSING, AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 375 (1987) (roughly one million bytes of information; a byte holds one
character, such as, A, B, C, #, &).
30. Hearing on Internet Access, supra note 10, at 129.
31. Raysman & Brown, supra note 8.
32. Malcolm Wheatley, Auntie Ventures into Taboo Zone, INDEPENDENT, July 31, 1994, at
12.
33. Brad Patten, Sex Rides the Fast Lane on Info Superhighway, PHOENix GAZETrE, Feb.
7, 1994, at Cl.
34. Raysman & Brown, supra note 8.
35. WEaSTER'S, supra note 3, at 2616 (The western United States in its frontier period).
36. Danesh, supra note 21.
37. Hearing on Internet Access, supra note 10 (statement of William L. Schrader, Chair-
man, President, and CEO of Performance Systems International, Inc.).
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D. Crimes on the Internet
Crimes perpetrated on the Internet can be grouped into three ma-
jor categories: 1) computer crimes, 2) fraud, and 3) noncomputer
crimes. Computer crimes include those crimes where knowledge of a
computer system is essential to commit the crime. Fraud comprises its
own category, since it was the only noncomputer crime acknowledged
by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. Noncomputer crimes
include all other forms of crime.
1. Computer crimes
Computer crimes typically include hacking,38 worms,39 and vi-
ruses.40 Hackers divide themselves into two groups: 1) hackers, who
have no intent to do "any criminal activity,"'" and 2) crackers4" who
intend to engage in criminal activity.43 Reports show that the number
of incidents of electronic break-ins into computer systems has nearly
doubled each year. At the Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh,
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) notes an increase
in reported incidents.
Year Number of Break-Ins"
1989 132
1990 252
1991 406
1992 773
1993 1,334
1994 2,341
The Department of Energy also noticed that the number of elec-
tronic break-ins has more than doubled each year. In 1990 there were
38. Laura Evenson & Michelle Quinn, Outlaws on the Cyberprairie, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 2,
1995, at IJZI (Hacking is computer trespass. There may, or may not, be any intent to engage in
any other criminal activity.).
39. Unites States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991) (Worms are computer
programs that migrate from computer to computer without attaching to the computer's operating
system.).
40. Id. (Viruses are computer programs that migrate from computer to computer and attach
to the computer's operating system.).
41. Evenson & Quinn, supra note 38 (Hackers do not consider breaking into a computer
system a crime.).
42. Id. (Crackers: CRiminal hACKERS).
43. I1&
44. Hacker 'Not Very Difficult to Catch,' USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1995, at 3B.
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forty-five electronic break-ins into Department of Energy Computers;
in 1993 there were four hundred electronic break-ins.4 5
At first seen as a prank by young kids, law enforcement is now
taking computer crimes very seriously - both here and abroad. People
have come to realize that hacking is not victimless. Recently a hacker
passed through the network belonging to The Boeing Company. The
Boeing Company paid $75,000 to its employees to have them check
their system and verify that no damage was done.46 CERT observed
that hackers are increasingly sophisticated.4 7 While ten years ago
most hackers were youthful pranksters interested in demonstrating
technical prowess, many Internet users today feel that more sinister
forces are at work - a sort of net mafia a.4  For example, in early Feb-
ruary 1994, CERT concluded that there was an organized effort to
infiltrate the Intemet.49
The hacker may go beyond breaking into a computer system and
actually alter or destroy data.5 This damage is usually done by either
45. Science & Technology Week: Computer Police Strike Back Against Internet Crimes,
(CNN television broadcast, April 2, 1994) [hereinafter Computer Police].
46. Evenson & Quinn, supra note 38.
47. Joshua Cooper Ramo, A SWAT Team in Cyberspace, NEwswEEK, Feb. 21, 1994, at 73.
48. Id
49. It
50. Several individuals have been indicted for computer crimes. See David Johnston,
Cracking Down on Cybercrime, OTTAWA CTIZN, June 18, 1995, at A5 (A 20-year old man in
Toronto charged with accessing nearly every university in Ontario); Richard Karpinski, Accused
Hackers Plead Guilty, TELEPHONY, July 16, 1990, at 12 (Robert Riggs, Adam E. Grant, and
Franklin E. Darden, Jr., members of the Legion of Doom, pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud
Bell South); Evenson & Quinn, supra note 38 (Kevin Poulson used knowledge of the phone
system to win two Porsches and $50,000 in cash from various Los Angeles radio stations; Justin
Tanner Petersen was Poulson's accomplice in the radio scams and pled guilty to tapping credit
card information bureau and transferring $150,000 from a Glendale financial institution; Mitnick
stole credit card numbers from network computers and hacked computers at MCI Communica-
tions and Digital Equipment Corporation and destroyed accounting files); John Markoff, Case
Stirs More Fear of Hackers; Internet Showing Its Vulnerability, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 17, 1995,
§ A at 19; John Johnson, A Computer Terrorist or a Prankster?, L.A. TiMES, February 26, 1995,
§ Metro, Part B, at l(Mitnick stole secret computer files from various companies); Caroline A.
Duffy, Crackdown in Cyberspace? Boston University Student Indicted for Criminal Activity on
Internet, PC WK. Apr. 18, 1994, at 15 (David LaMacchia, an MIT student, was indicted for
setting up a computer to download copyrighted software worth more than $1 million); Mark
Guidera, Internet Falls Prey to Crime; Cyber Crooks Put Users on Defensive, PHoENIX GA-
z~rre, Aug. 12, 1994, at A27 (Clarkson University had at least one confirmed case of destroying
and possibly stealing files. In researching the break-in, Clarkson employees found evidence that
as many as twenty other universities may have been targeted as well); Laurent Belsie, The Dark
Side ofCyberspace, CHRIs'nAN Sci. MONITOR, July 18, 1994, at 119 (Paul Bedworth broke into
approximately 10,000 computer systems in the United States, France, Germany, India, and Rus-
sia); Computer Police, supra note 45 (Mark Abene broke into computer networks used by the
government, many banks and phone companies); Paola Piglia & A.J.S. Rayl, Secrets of the
Cyberculture; Counterculture Movement Lead by Computer Hackers, 15 OMM 58 (Nov. 1992),
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viruses or worms.5' Viruses and worms cause havoc by deleting files,
by replicating until all space is used and the system crashes, or by
bringing the system down.52
2. Fraud
Fraud was the only noncomputer crime recognized in the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.11 Therefore, fraud could be seen
as the keystone between computer crimes and noncomputer crimes.
Internet fraud includes: stealing credit card numbers, transferring
funds to a numbered account in another country, ordering goods and
then cancelling the charge to the bank account.54 To identify credit
card numbers, hackers use software known as packet sniffers."
Computer networks have also been used to perpetrate investment
fraud. 6 Typically these schemes lure naive consumers to invest in
future technologies. While the future technologies may have been le-
gitimate, the investment opportunity was a scam. Other schemes
have included unregistered securities, Ponzi scams, 8 pyramid
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS file (Robert T. Morris, Jr. released a worm that
infected U.S. 6,500 computers on the Internet, which caused $150 - 200 million in damages).
51. Terms to Know, INFoWoRLD, Feb 13, 1995, at 91.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
54. Joseph Radigan, Info Highway Robbers Try Cracking the Vault... Or 50 Million
Ways to Fleece Your Banker, U.S. BANKEm, May 1995, at 67. See also Amy Cortese, Warding
Off the Cyberspace Invaders, Bus. WK., Mar. 13, 1995, at 92 (an MCI technician was charged
with capturing more than 50,000 credit card numbers; he sold these cards to a network of dealers,
resulting in fraudulent charges in excess of $50 million); Guidera, supra note 50, at A27 (an
international ring operating in Europe used stolen telephone calling card numbers to call the
United States and set up Internet accounts; they paid for the accounts using the stolen credit
cards); Cyberblotter: The Internet's Most Wanted, PrrTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, July 25, 1995, at
C4 (two seemingly legitimate vendors bilked $27,000 from Internet users by offering trading
cards for a popular game called "Magic"; a 15-year old boy stole a credit card number from the
Internet and bought a $4,800 computer to be delivered to Arnold Ziffel of Green Acres fame);
John Larrabee, Cyberspace a New Beat for Police, USA TODAY, April 26, 1994, at IA (John
Lucich, investigator with the New Jersey Attorney General, accessed a dozen underground com-
puter bulletin board services (BBSs) where stolen credit card numbers were swapped among
computer hackers).
55. Packet sniffers scan the content of Internet messages looking for 16-digits broken up
by spaces (the format for charge cards). Charles Arthur, Crime Gangs Use Internet to Access
Credit Card Fraud, INDEPENDENT, June 2, 1995, § Home, at 3.
56. L.A. Lorek, Fraud Entering Cyberspace; High-tech Con Artists Ply Schemes via Infor-
mation Avenues, SUN-SEnNm., July 3, 1994, at 1G.
57. One company used a thirty-minute infomercial to bilk $16.5 million from 1,600 inves-
tors for specialized mobile radio licenses. Other con artists pitch wireless cable television
franchises; one firm collected $10.3 million from 740 investors. Id.
58. Mark Simon, No Assets Found At Loan Firm; San Jose Company Being Investigated
for Scam, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1995, at A15 ("A Ponzi scam is a pyramid scheme in which
phony investment are sold and the money is paid out to earlier investors to create the appearance
of legitimacy:').
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schemes,59 and stock manipulation plansA0 Despite these risks, there
are at least forty to fifty financial institutions who have set up pro-
grams on the Internet.
3. Noncomputer Crime
The most recent and most disturbing trend has been the use of the
Internet to perpetrate traditional, noncomputer crimes. The most
widely reported crimes are: 1) distribution of pornography, 2)
pedophilia,6' 3) stalking, and 4) hate speech. Other crimes include
death threats, bomb manufacturing instructions, and virtual gambling
casinos.62
a. Pornography
The use of the Internet to distribute pornography has received
much media attention.63 Pornographic images are loaded onto the In-
ternet. The Internet user must access files and download them to view
the images. The vast majority of pornographic images are kept in pri-
vate bulletin board services, which usually require you to aver that
you are at least eighteen years of age.
Estimates of the amount of pornography available on the Internet
vary widely.' 4 A Carnegie-Mellon University study indicated that
more than eighty-three percent of all images stores in Usenet news
groups are pornographic and nearly fifty percent of all downloads
from commercial bulletin boards depict child pornography, incest, tor-
59. WEasraa's, supra note 3, at 1852 (the series of operations involved in enlarging one's
holdings "by using paper profits as margin to buy additional amounts").
60. Lorek, supra note 56, at 1G.
61. WEEsmE's, supra note 3, at 1665 (sexual perversion in which children are the pre-
ferred sexual object).
62. Ron Bartlett, Global Casinos Pose Virtual Mess, TAwA Tmia., Aug. 27, 1995, at 1.
63. For example, on LEXIS when searching for "Internet and pornography." in 1994 there
are nearly 300 newspaper articles, in 1995 there were nearly 2,000, and in the first six weeks of
1996, there were over 500. LEXIS, NEWS library, PAPERS file.
64. In the first half of 1994 alone there were several incidents of child pornography re-
ported using computer networks. See Charlotte Parsons, Cheap Price Techno Porn Back on
Sale, SoUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Apr. 24, 1994, at 3 (U.S. law enforcement officials uncov-
ered a child computer pornography ring centered at Birmingham University in Britain); John
Larrabee, Cyberspace a New Beat for Police, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 1994, at IA (In Medford,
Massachusetts police entered the home of a rape suspect and found computers, camera equip-
ment, high-resolution video monitors. Police suspect that the man operated a network that trans-
mitted child pornography); Barbara Kantrowitz, et al., Child Abuse in Cyberspace, NEWSwEEK,
Apr. 18, 1994, at 40 (United States Customs Service seized computers and discs of 88 Americans
downloading child pornography from Denmark); Michael Da, New Moral Crisis: Computer
Porn, HousToN PosT, Feb. 20, 1994, at A10 (a college computer instructor in Farmington, Con-
necticut traded pornographic pictures of children through a secret BBS; an Abilene man became
the first person convicted by a federal jury of importing illegal child pornography by computer).
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ture, or mutilation.65 This translates to more than 450,000 porno-
graphic images and text files, which were accessed more than six
million times.66 There is currently no way of knowing how may of
these six million accesses were made by children.
Critics of the study, however, point out that this study was lim-
ited to the Usenet groups and included private-adult-bulletin-board
systems, which are not publicly available. Therefore, this grossly ex-
aggerates the amount of pornography available to children on the In-
ternet.67 Moreover, it has been reported that children not only access
pornography, they distribute it.6"
The amount of pornography placed on the Internet in the United
States may drop precipitously, however, now that a Milpitas, Califor-
nia couple was convicted69 in Tennessee on eleven counts of obscen-
ity. They face fifty-five years in prison and a $2.75 million fine.70
b. Pedophilia
A second example of noncomputer crime is pedophilia. Many
bulletin boards on the Internet deal with sex. In fact, of the top ten
BBSs, several are exclusively for sex talk.7 1 The vast majority target
adults. However, others target children. For example, one BBS in
Ottawa, The Boywatchers Inc.,72 is a forum for pedophilia.73
Pedophilia and stalking are found in both the public and private
areas of the Internet. Most contact with children takes place in pub-
licly-available chat rooms. Chat rooms are areas in cyberspace
wherein individuals can engage in real-time interactive conversations.
65. Dan Coats, 'Dark Side' of the Internet, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1995, at A23.
66. Joe Chidley, Red-Light District, MActLaEA's, May 22, 1995, at 58.
67. Professors Donna Hoffman and Thomas Novak of Vanderbilt University state that
Rimm's statistics are misleading. For example, of the 14,000 electronic news groups worldwide,
only 200 carry pornographic messages or pictures. This represents less than one-half of one
percent of all messages on the Internet. Scott L. Powers, Cyberporn has Time up in Flames, B.
GLOBE, July 19, 1995, at 67; Elizabeth Corcoran, Cybersensitivity? Critics Say the Media Over-
reacted to a Study on Computer Pornography, WASH. PosT, June 28, 1995, at CI, C8.
68. In 1993, police in Winnipeg and Toronto raided a BBS which distributed obscene
material; a 14-year-old boy allegedly operated the service. Abraham, supra note 5, at B5. In
Sacramento County, a 14-year-old boy was brought in by his mother with a handful of floppy
disks containing pornographic materials, which he had received from an adult on-line. Kantro-
witz, supra note 64.
69. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
70. James C. Harrington, Should the Plug be Pulled on Cyberporn? Beware of Chilling
Freedom of Expression, DAU.As MoRxrNro NEws, Apr. 9, 1995, at IJ.
71. Abraham, supra note 5.
72. "Inc." means incest rather than "incorporated." Kevin O'Brien, Down a Dark Alley,
PLNA DEtR, May 22, 1994, at 1C.
73. Abraham, supra note 5.
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Far more frightening than access to pornography in cyberspace is
the harm done to children in the real world as the result of contacts
made in cyberspace. Children have been lured from their homes and
molested based on conversations in chat rooms on the Intemet.74
c. Stalking
Another problem prevalent on the Internet is the increased use of
computerized data bases for stalking. The ratio of men to women on
the Internet is three to one. Many women become victims of on-line
harassment, or stalking, and receive obscene and/or misogynist75 mail
from e-perverts.7 6 For example, Cheryl L. Willis was barraged by
mail from a man called "Hellraiser" who tried to sabotage her system.
He even sent nasty messages to her friends. 77 Connecticut Represen-
tative Patricia Dillon, a daily Internet user, drafted legislation after
learning that a woman received repeated threatening messages. The
messages falsely accused the woman of being promiscuous and ridi-
culed her retarded son.78
Jake Baker, a student at the University of Michigan (UM), was
arrested for stalking when he placed three stories on the Internet about
fantasies that included, rape, mutilation, torture, and murder.79 Jake
74. See Vincent J. Schodolski, Online Anonymity Conducive to Vice; Teens are Vulnerable
in Cyberspace, CHI. TRIB., June I1, 1995, § News, at 19 (A 13-year-old girl left home to accept
an offer from a man to run around a room naked all day and all night; she has not been seen
since. John Rex is accused of kidnapping and raping two boys he met through a computer
bulletin board service. Alan Paul Barlow was convicted for describing his sexual fantasies to 14-
year-old girls in Montana and New Jersey); Mary Murphy, Computer Prowlers Stalk Kids, OR-
LAmDo SmamN L, July 9, 1995, at I (Prosecutors were able to convict Barlow after he solicited
lewd photographs and sent them Polaroid cameras. Donald Harvey sent explicit e-mail messages
and pictures, and then he flew to Orlando to have sex with what he thought was a 14-year-old
boy); Larrabee, supra note 54 (Michael Austin, who has a history of sexual assaults, used his
computer to befriend boys, lured them into meeting him, and raped at least two of the boys.
Austin is currently serving a 20-year prison sentence); Kantrowitz et al., supra note 64, at 40 (A
computer engineer used America Online to communicate with a 14-year old boy and arranged to
meet him in person. Before taking the boy home, he handcuffed, shackled, and blindfolded him.
Once home, he spanked him with a belt, forced him to have an enema, shaved his legs, and pubic
hair, and engaged him in oral and anal sex. He then ordered boy to write about the abuse on-
line; the father discovered the graphic account); Sandy Rovner, Molesting Children by Com-
puter, WASH. PosT, Aug. 2, 1994, at Z15 (A 14-year-old girl thought she was corresponding with
a teenage boy. She gave him her phone number. She began receiving indecent phone calls from
a 51-year-old man).
75. WEBsTm's, supra note 3, at 1444 (one given to a hatred of women).
76. Rovner, supra note 74.
77. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rules of Road on the Information Highway: Law Makes Harass-
ing by Computer a Crime, N.Y. TiaMis, June 13, 1995, at B4.
78. Id.
79. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Snuff Porn on the Net: A Student's Sex Fantasies Raise Dis-
turbing Questions About the Limits of Free Speech in Cyberspace, TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at 69.
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used the name of a fellow student as the victim's name and sent e-mail
to someone in Canada expressing that he would like to carry out these
fantasies. The FBI arrested Jake under a federal statute that prohibits
interstate transmission of a threat to kidnap or injure. U.S. District
Judge Avem Cohn threw out the five-count indictment holding that
you cannot be arrested for your fantasies.80
While the number of incidents are few, it will be interesting to
watch the development in this area. Will jurisdictions follow Rep.
Dillon's lead, or will jurisdictions treat Internet stalking as fantasy?
d. Hate speech
Lastly, the Internet has been used for hatemongering.81 This in-
cludes jokes about, threats to, and advice on how to kill members of
minority groups. Right-wing extremists from militia members to Ar-
yan Nation hatemongers are using the Internet to spread their
message.82 Since Neo-Nazis are barred from selling their books in
Germany, they have turned to the Internet to distribute their hate
tracts.8 3 To date, no cases involving hate speech on the Internet have
been prosecuted.
e. Other crimes
There are numerous other crimes that people have engaged in
through the use of the Internet. For example, in Laval, Quebec three
boys were maimed after using instructions on how to build a pipe
bomb, which they had acquired from a nineteen year-old Massachu-
setts man. 4 A nineteen year-old Texas College student was indicted
for sending death threats to President Clinton by e-mail.85 Cyber-
gambling is a rapidly developing market as offshore companies, based
mostly in the Caribbean, offering virtual reality casinos.8 6
As the Internet becomes more widely used, the frequency and
variety of noncomputer crime has increased. This has resulted in
some legislators calling for regulation of cyberspace.
80. United States v. Baker, 890 F.Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
81. Abraham, supra note 5.
82. David WiIlman & Ralph Frammolino, Facing the Fear of an Enemy from Within, L.A.
Twats, Apr. 22, 1995, at Al.
83. Belsie, supra note 50.
84. Abraham, supra note 5.
85. Larrabee, supra note 54.
86. Ron Bartlett, Global Casinos Pose Virtual Mess, TAMPA TRaB., Aug. 27, 1995, at Flor-
ida/Metro 1.
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E. Struggle within the Anarchy: Combatting Crime versus
Individual Freedom
With Internet crime increasing, battle lines are being drawn. As
system administrators and law enforcement officials scan bulletin
boards, posing as victims and tracing transactions, they meet a wave
of resistance from Internet operators and users who deplore govern-
ment snooping and intrusion. Users fear that the Internet, or portions
of it, will be shut down or censored in the name of law and order.
1. Combating Crime
Combatting crime on the Internet is still in its infancy. However,
there are three major groups making efforts to control cyberspace: the
Computer Emergency Response Team, major providers of commercial
on-line services, and law enforcement officials.
To combat unauthorized access on the Internet, any break-ins are
reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) located
at the Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh." A staff of 15 pro-
grammers do the initial investigation. Complicated security breaches
are farmed out to an unofficial brain trust.88
To combat pornography and indecency, some major commercial
services, such as Prodigy and America Online, censor sex talk. 9
However, efforts to screen content may markedly decrease as opera-
tors face possible liability for obscenity. In Stratton Oakmont Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co.9" Judge Ain ruled that Prodigy was a publisher,
not merely a conduit or library, in a libel case. Judge Ain ruled that
because Prodigy monitors content it can be held liable for slanderous
material. 91 This ruling will undoubtedly discourage commercial serv-
ices from monitoring content of transmissions.
Specially trained law enforcement officials, or those with com-
puter backgrounds, hack into sedret bulletin boards. 92 Many times
they try to locate suspects by posing as women or teen-age boys (the
most likely victims). 93 By posing as women or teen-age boys, law
87. Guidera, supra note 50.
88. Joshua C. Ramo, How to Fight Crime on the Internet, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 1994, at
73.
89. Michelle Slatalla, Prodigy Libel Ruling Changes Online Scene, NEWSDAY, May 28,
1995, at 4.
90. 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1995), available on LEXIS, 1995 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. 1995).
91. Clinton Wilder, Prodigy Put on the Line - Service May Be Held Liable for Content,
INroRMATONWEEK, June 12, 1995, at 24.
92. Larrabee, supra note 54.
93. Id
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enforcement officers engage in conversation and eventually set up a
sting operation.
Some law enforcement officials formed their own groups. In the
United States the Hi-Tech Crime Network is an informal group of
computer-savvy police officers.94
Not only do law enforcement officials try to capture criminals
on-line, they have started to solicit help from Internet users. For ex-
ample, the FBI's UNABOM Task force was the first probe in which
federal agents used the Internet to solicit help from Internet users.95
The Task Force was investigating a series of mail bombings during the
past fifteen years that killed three and injured twenty-three - the
bomber is referred to as the UNABOMBER.96 Scholars and research-
ers were targeted to receive these explosive devices. As part of their
investigation, the FBI kept a page on World Wide Web of the status of
the case.
2. Individual Freedom
While the FBI states that e-mail transmissions have the same pri-
vacy rights as surface mail,97 many civil libertarians remain skeptical.
Some doubt they will continue to enjoy the freedom they currently
have on Internet. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, for example, is
dedicated to preserving individual liberties on the Internet. Mike God-
win, a lawyer for the Foundation says:
I hear "pedophile" every time they try to justify some new intru-
sion .... There's nothing inappropriate about law enforcement po-
licing cyberspace, but I'm skeptical of all their claims. There aren't
enough pedophiles in the country to justify all the hype.98
Many people liken the Internet to the telephone system. One observer
noted:
[W]e do not have laws saying who can or cannot drive down the
street or use the telephone, and no one has charged the local phone
company when a scam artist uses a telephone to cheat some elderly
couple out of their savings.... The same should go for the Internet
94. l.
95. Bill Wallace, Computer Net Used to Solicit Bombing Clues, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 31,
1993, at Al.
96. John O'Brien, Technology Fights Back Against Unabomber, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 13,
1995, at Cl.
97. Rovner, supra note 74.
98. Larrabee, supra note 54.
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and online services. It should be open for anyone and everyone to
use.
99
The recent Memphis case convicting Robert and Carleen Thomas
of eleven counts of distributing pornography was particularly dis-
turbing to Internet users and operators.' 00 The Thomases were con-
victed based on the "contemporary community standards" of
Memphis, Tennessee.'' This decision will probably be appealed to
the United States Supreme Court where the Court may use it as an
opportunity to redefine the notion of community standards.' 2 How-
ever, one observer at the Thomas trial felt that the many of the 20,000
digital images would have offended any community, because they in-
cluded images of incest, bestiality, genital torture, urine and feces.'03
Operators and users found this decision a disturbing form of cen-
sorship, because it applied Memphis, Tennessee standards of obscen-
ity to material produced in Milpitas, California and distributed
internationally." ° Many feel that it sets a dangerous precedent.
Bruce Kramer, ACLU attorney in a "Deep Throat" case, 0 5 com-
mented on the recent conviction of the Thomases: "The message go-
ing out there is, do this at your peril .... This is censorship any way
you look at it."'0 6
The conviction of the Thomases "hit the on-line community like
a cold shower." 7 Laura Brito operates a Missouri BBS called
Laura's Lair. She is also the co-administrator of an adult BBS net-
work called Throbnet. Commenting on the Memphis decisions, Brito
said: "Everybody is scared .... We wish we knew what the rules are.
If I knew what the rules are, I certainly would follow them."'1 8 How-
ever, complying with community standards everywhere may be diffi-
cult, if not impossible.
99. James Crawley, Memphis Porn Decision is Far-Reaching: Ruling Causes Concerns
About Right of Online Computer Users, SAN DmoO UN oN-TIB., Aug., 16, 1994, at 9.
100. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
101. Id at 710-11.
102. Id
103. Jim McMahon, Cyberporn Can Be Regulated, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 21, 1994, at B-5.
104. David Landis, Sex Laws & Cyberspace; Regulating Porn: Does it Compute, USA
TODAY, Aug. 9, 1994, at ID.
105. In the "Deep Throat" cases the U.S. attorney's office in Memphis charged 60 people
and companies for transporting Deep Throat across state lines even though the film was never
shown in Memphis. Joshua Quittner, Computers in the '90's; Life in Cyberspace; The Issue of
Porn on Computers, NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 1994, at B27. See United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d
237 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548
(6th Cir. 1981).
106. Quittner, supra note 105.
107. Landis, supra note 104.
108. Id
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The latest complication in Internet telecommunications is that
foreign governments are exerting pressure on service providers to cen-
sor the content or prevent access to certain material. Germany first
targeted sex-related news forums and persuaded CompuServe to cut
off access. 109 German law enforcement also investigated anti-Semitic
and neo-Nazi propaganda.110
In typical Internet style, when the German government threatened
to cut off the site at Web Communication in Santa Cruz, California,
free-speech advocates in other parts of the country copied the material
and posted it on their web sites.'
F. The Need for Legislation
While several groups are dedicated to maintaining the unbridled
freedom of the Internet, Congress has realized the need for legislation.
One of the prime reasons for legislation is to address the concerns
Brito expressed: define the rules so that people will know how to
conform their behavior. What should be the appropriate governmental
response is sporadically debated. It includes such diametrically-op-
posed suggestions as "don't regulate it, because technology moves
too fast for Congress to respond""I2 to "allow common law to regulate
technology, because common law moves so slowly.""' 3 Others have
postulated that any form of regulation is inappropriate for cyberspace,
particularly regulating concepts of property and copyright." 14 One ob-
server suggested denying copyright privileges to pornography and let-
ting economics drive pornographers out of business." 5  Another
suggested that pornography is just a phase, and the Internet will grow
through it."
6
However, it is clear that the information industry has reached the
critical mass necessary to detonate government regulation:
109. Peter Lewis, Blocking the Net Easier Said Than Done, DENY. PosT, Jan. 28, 1996, at
H-24.
110. Ernst Zundel, a German living in Canada, placed on the Internet propaganda denying
the Holocaust. Hiawatha Bray, UMass Shuts Down Web Site Containing Neo-Nazi Material;
Student Intended Protest of German Censorship, B. GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1996, at 28.
111. Id.
112. John Frohnmayer, Don't Tread on the 'Net, PrrrsBURGH PosT-GAzETrE, Apr. 9, 1995,
at Fl.
113. Id
114. Cruising the Information Highway: Cyberspace and the American Dream; A Magna
Carta for the Knowledge Age, ETHNic NEwsWATcH, Mar. 31, 1995, at 42.
115. Casey B. Mulligan, Pornography, Profits and the Internet, Cti. TIaB. June 28, 1995,
Perspective, at 19.
116. Tim Jackson. The Porn Brokers, LUSH TimEs, June 19, 1995, at 8.
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The revolution has only just begun, but already it's starting to over-
whelm us. It's outstripping our capacity to cope, antiquating our
laws, transforming our mores, reshuffling our economy, reordering
our priorities, redefining our workplaces, [and] putting our Consti-
tution to the fire.' 17
As a result, national politics is polarizing into two camps: those
whose interests remain with the Industrial Age and those whose inter-
ests are hooked to the emerging Digital Age. This is creating stranger-
than-usual bedfellows, such as the right-wing libertarians and
counterculture hippies who hold as core values more self-reliance and
less governmental intrusion.' 8
I. THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE AcT (18 U.S.C. § 1030)119
In response to the demand for regulating the Internet, Congress
should use The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as its vehicle. The
Internet has already been deemed to fall within the purview of the Act
as evidenced by the conviction of Robert Morris in 1988.120 The Act,
which currently limits its scope to computer crimes and fraud, could
be expanded to include noncomputer crimes. The scope of the Act has
been continuously broadened as the scope of computer crime
broadens.
At the time Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
of 1984, the computer industry did not know the scope of computer
crime.' 2 ' However, Congress knew that over twenty states had al-
ready enacted legislation in this area and many more were in the pro-
cess of enacting computer legislation.122 This part discusses the
evolution of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act from its inception
through the most recent proposed amendment in 1995.
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984
In enacting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Con-
gress rejected broader bills that would have tied the criminalization to
interstate commerce. Congress intentionally limited the scope of the
legislation to protect only the vital federal interests.' 23 In passing the
117. Steven Levy, TechnoMania, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1995, at 24.
118. Peter Leyden, Politics of the Digital Age Creating Stranger-Than-Usual Bedfellows,
STAR TmB., June 25, 1995, at 2T.
119. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1996).
120. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 817
(1991). See infra, note 168 and accompanying text.
121. Griffith, supra note 6, at 455-56.
122. IL at 459.
123. Id. at 456.
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Congress was restrained by two
fears: redundancy124 and overreaching. 125
Consequently, to narrow the scope, scienter 126 was required for
each of the offenses to the extent that the person had to knowingly
access "the computer without authorization, or having accessed a
computer with authorization, used the opportunity such access pro-
vided for purposes to which such authorization did not extend."127 In
addition, the original act covered only three narrow areas: 1) accessing
a computer to get classified defense or foreign relations information to
harm the United States or to advantage a foreign nation, 2) accessing a
computer to get financial records from a financial institution or con-
sumer information from consumer reporting agencies, and 3) modify-
ing, destroying, or disclosing information if such conduct affects the
government's use of the computer.1
28
In subsection (a)(1) Congress intentionally excluded the inadver-
tent access by a government employee into unauthorized files. This
section is directed to those outside the government. However, it also
includes those within the government who exceed their authority. As
one of the three original provisions of the bill, Congress narrowly
drew this section to only include the most vital federal interests.
Subsection (a)(2) targets computer hackers and other criminals
accessing financial information without authorization. Congress in-
tentionally drafted the intent requirement to exclude information inci-
dentally obtained or information obtained legitimately. The intent
requirement applies only to the access prong of the subsection. There-
fore, a prosecutor must prove intent to access - not intent to injure. 129
The scope of subsection (a)(3) is limited by the phrase "affects
the use of the Government's operation of such computer." It required
the prosecutor to prove that the access affected computer operation. If
the access did not affect computer operation, subsection (a)(3) does
not apply.' 30
The offenses defined in subsection (a) are criminalized in subsec-
tion (b); subsection (c) sets out the penalties. Subsection (c) differen-
124. An unnecessary repetition of federal legislation when the states already have passed
legislation on the subject matter.
125. When federal authority stretches into areas and preempts where the states already have
legislated; Griffith, supra note 6, 458.
126. BA RON's LAw DicriONAY 433 (3d ed. 1991) ("Previous knowledge of an operative
state of facts.").
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3) (1988).
128. Id
129. Griffith, supra note 6, at 463-464.
130. Id
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tiates first offenses from subsequent offenses and gives much stiffer
penalties for subsequent offenses. A subsequent offense is defined as
"a conviction for another offense under such subsection or an attempt
to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph."' , 3 1
B. Criticism of the 1984 Act
Legislators realized that the 1984 Act was only a first step toward
controlling computer fraud and abuse and that the legislation was in-
complete. Critics of the 1984 Act noted that the scienter requirement
was higher than required for other applicable espionage laws.1 32 Sub-
section (a)(2) on the protection of financial and credit information was
too limited. First, it protected a very narrow class of financial and
credit information. For example, it excluded the bank's deposits in
other institutions and loan records. Second, it protected only individu-
als and not corporations.1 33 Subsection (a)(3) on modifying, destroy-
ing, or disclosing information required that prosecutors prove the
additional elements of modification, destruction, or disclosure. 134
Both subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) had a drafting inconsistency that
resulted in a use exemption: if a person with authority accessed infor-
mation for which they were not authorized, there were no sanctions
for using the data. This was clearly inconsistent with Congressional
intent. 135
C. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
In response to these criticisms, and in light of suggestions to in-
crease the scope of the legislation, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
was amended in 1986.
The 1986 Amendment made significant changes to the Act. Prior
to the 1986 amendment, the Act defined the intent requirement as
"having accessed a computer with authorization." The 1986 amend-
ment simplified this awkward phrase to read "exceeds authorized ac-
cess." The 1986 Amendment also defined the key terms used in the
original Act.1 36 By making access alone a criminal offense, the 1986
Amendment transformed subsection (a)(3) into a strict trespass provi-
sion.137 However, this section limited the trespass offense to those
offenders who were not employed by the federal government and had
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c). For a detailed discussion of the penalties, see infra part II.F.
132. Griffith, supra note 6, at 467.
133. l at 467.
134. ld at 468.
135. Id at 464.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e).
137. l § 1030(a)(3). See Griffith, supra note 6, at 476.
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no authority to access a federal interest computer.138 Congress had a
potential concern that the word "disclosure" in subsection (a)(3) might
discourage those seeking to expose wrongdoing by the federal govern-
ment. Therefore, the 1986 Amendment deleted the word "disclo-
sure.' 1 39 In response the concerns expressed by the Department of
Justice, the 1986 Amendment reduced the intent requirement of sec-
tions (a)(2) and (a)(3) from "knowingly" to "intentionally." This
brought the intent requirement in line with those for espionage. 140
The House Report on the Criminal Code expressed a fear that a know-
ing standard imposes liability on inadvertent access. 14 ' Therefore,
legislators substituted an intentional standard to target those who in-
tentionally, rather than inadvertently, access files without authoriza-
tion. 14 2 Finally, the 1986 Amendment repealed the specific fines in
the original act and replaced them with the fines imposed "under this
title."' 4 3 This, in effect, tied the crimes to the Criminal Fine Enforce-
ment Act of 1984.1'
In addition, three new offenses were added: subsection (a)(4) -
access with intent to defraud; subsection (a)(5) - altering, damaging or
destroying data or preventing authorized use; subsection (a)(6) - ac-
cess with intent to defraud traffics in any password. 145
Subsection (a)(4) created a federal computer fraud offense. Con-
gress intentionally decided not to pattern this section after the mail and
wire fraud statutes.' 4 6 Unlike the mail and wire fraud statutes, the
computer must be an integral part of the fraud and may not be wholly
extraneous. Congress did not want to punish mere access of a com-
puter at or near the time of the fraud. Congress also emphasized theft
of property to be sure that the defendant intended to or did obtain
something of value and not just computer time. 4 7
Subsection (a)(5) primarily targets: 1) losses greater than $1,000
during a single year, and 2) alteration data for medical treatment.
Since this offense is a felony, a $1,000 threshold was set to exclude
minor amounts or cases in which the amount of loss could not be
proven. However, losses can easily reach this threshold because
losses include the following expenses: lost computer time, reprogram-
138. Griffith, supra note 6, at 476.
139. id at 474.
140. 1&
141. H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980)
142. Griffith, supra note 6, at 475-76.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3623; Griffith, supra note 6, at 481.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)-(6).
146. S. REP. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986), at 9.
147. Id. at 9-10; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
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ming, restoring data, certain network communication fees, and the
time of authorized users who rely on the altered data. 148
The prosecutor need not show pecuniary loss for altering records
involved in medical treatment.149 Congress felt that tampering with
medical records is serious enough to be a felony. 150
Subsection (a)(6), the last of the new offenses of the 1986 amend-
ment, criminalizes the trafficking of computer passwords. This sub-
section targets hackers trading computer passwords over bulletin
boards. The mental requirement includes both "knowingly" and "with
intent to defraud. ' 151 It applies to passwords or information that allow
access to federal government computers. However, this section also
includes password trafficking if it affects interstate or foreign
commerce. 1
52
One of the major enhancements to the 1986 version of the Act
was the definition of key terms in subsection (e). At the suggestion of
the Justice Department,' 53 Congress expanded the definition of "Fed-
eral interest computer" to include "a computer.., which is one of two
,or more computers used in committing the offense, not all of which
are located in the same State."' 54 This addition covered those cases in
which state law enforcement officials lacked jurisdiction. If a crime
defined in the Act was committed using computers in more than one
state, local law enforcement officials now had recourse at the federal
level.
D. Expanding the Scope of the Act: the 1988, 1989, and 1990
Amendments
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 155 was originally proposed
to be very narrow in scope. In the ensuing years the rate and serious-
ness of computer fraud and abuse grew rapidly. As a result, the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act has been amended several times. The
1988 Amendment corrected the punctuation in Subsection (a)(2), clar-
ifying that the Act covers all financial institutions and not just those
that issue credit cards. The 1989 Amendments replaced "a bank"
with "an institution" in Subsection (e)(4)(a), and struck out: "an insti-
tution with accounts insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
148. Griffith, supra note 6, at 480.
149. d at 479-80.
150. S. REP. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986), at 9.
151. 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6).
152. I1 § 1030(a)(6)(A).
153. Griffith, supra note 6, at 481-82.
154. 18 U.S.C. §1030(e).
155. Id § 1030.
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ance Corporation." 156  Consequently, any institutions with deposits
insured by the FDIC are now included. The 1990 Amendments cor-
rected the reference to paragraph "r" in the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 to paragraph "y"1 7 and added "commonwealth" to the definition
of "State."
The 1990 Amendments also expanded the scope of the act to in-
clude two additional "financial institutions" in subsection (e)(4):
(H) a branch' 58 or agency 159 of a foreign bank 160 (as such terms
are defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1 (b) of the Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1978);
(I) an organization operating under section 25161 or section
25(a) 162 of the Federal Reserve Act.
E. The 1994 Amendment
The 1994 Amendment rewrote the fifth offense: altering, damag-
ing, or destroying data, or preventing authorized use of the computer.
This amendment created two offenses based on intent. Subsection (A)
covers intentional acts; subsection (B) covers reckless acts. Once the
requisite mens rea 163 is defined, the wording within each section is
identical. In summary, the section proscribes: 1) damaging or poten-
tially damaging a computer system or its components, and 2) with-
holding, denying, or causing the withholding or denial of use of a
computer system or its components. These acts must be without au-
156. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1996) (history of the amendments to the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
157. Paragraph y defines the term "restricted data" includes "all data concerning (1) design,
manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or
(3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y).
158. "'[B]ranch' means any office or place of business of a foreign bank located in any
State of the United States at which deposits are received." 32 U.S.C. § 3101(3).
159. "'[Algency' means any office or place of business of a foreign bank located in any
State of the United States at which credit balances are maintained incidental to or arising out of
the exercise of banking powers, checks are paid, or money is lent but at which deposits may not
be accepted from citizens or residents of the United States." 32 U.S.C. § 3101(1).
160. "'[F]oreign bank' means any company organized under the law of a foreign coun-
try ... For the purposes of this act the term "foreign bank" includes, without limitation, foreign
commercial banks, foreign merchant banks and other foreign institutions that engage in banking
activities usual in connection with the business of banking in the countries where such foreign
institutions are organized or operating." 32 U.S.C. § 3101(7).
161. "Any national banking association possessing a capital and surplus of $1,000,000 or
more" which is accepted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C.
§ 601.
162. "Corporations to be organized for the purpose of engaging in international or foreign
financial operations." 12 U.S.C. § 611.
163. The mental state accompanying a forbidden act. STa-vEN H. Gnms, LAw DICnoNARY
296 (1991).
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thorization and must either cause loss of more than $1,000 in any one-
year period or alter medical records.
F. Penalties
Subsection (c) sets out the penalties for each of the six offenses.
The text of the punishments for all six offenses are similarly worded.
The table below summarizes these punishments. In the 1986 Amend-
ment all fines were described as "a fine under this title," which tied
them to the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984.14 The Criminal
Fine Enforcement Act allows for fines up to $100,000 for misdemean-
ors and $250,000 for felony convictions.
Penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 1030
Section
(a)(1): Access with
Intent to Injure the
Us
(a)(2): Access to
Financial Records
(a)(3): Access which
Affects Use
(a)(4): Access with
Intent to Defraud
(a)(5)(A): Intentional
Altering, Damaging
or Destroying Data
or Preventing
Authorized Use
(a)(6): Access with
Intent to Defraud
Traffics in Pass-
words
First Offense
Fine or prison for
not more than 10
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 1 year
Fine or prison for
not more than 1 year
Fine or prison for
not more than 5
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 5
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 1 year
Subsequent Offense
Fine or prison for
not more than 20
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 10
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 10
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 10
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 10
years
Fine or prison for
not more than 10
years
G. Cases Prosecuted under the Act
Because of the severe limitations of the 1984 Act, the federal
government never prosecuted any cases under it. Critics correctly
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3623; Griffith, supra note 6, at 481.
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noted that an Act cannot have a deterrent effect if prosecutions are
never brought.
Since the Act was revised in 1986, several cases have been prose-
cuted under the various subsections of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Of the
cases pursued, most involved theft or fraud including loss of
property. 165
One case, United States v. Rice, 66 involved fraud with no pecu-
niary loss. This case involved unauthorized access and unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information. An IRS agent, Rice, knew that
his long-time friend was under investigation for drug dealing, includ-
ing the possible forfeiture of his house. At his friend's request, Rice
checked the IRS computer to see if his friend was being investigated
by the IRS. Since Rice was not a member of the criminal division, he
exceeded his authorized access. Rice also went to the IRS investigator
to see what the codes on the printout meant. He then told his friend
the meaning of the codes and the investigator's name. This case was
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3). Rice was convicted (by a jury)
of computer fraud for accessing the computer system of a government
agency without authority; his convictions were affirmed.1 67
Another case, United States v. Morris,1 68 involved pecuniary loss
but not fraud. Morris was a first-year graduate student at Comell Uni-
versity working toward his Ph.D. in computer science. For an assign-
ment he developed a worm to demonstrate the inadequacies of current
security measures on computer networks. The assignment required
the worm to occupy little space while using minimal computer time
and not interfering with normal use. Morris included a feature to de-
termine if the worm had already infected the computer. If the worm
had infected the computer, the worm would not replicate.
165. See United States v. Sykes, 4 F.3d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1993) (unauthorized use of an
automated teller machine and personal identification number); United States v. DeMonte, 1992
U.S.App. LEXIS 11392 (6th Cir. May 12, 1992) (per curiam) (affd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded, 25 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1994) (an employee made more than 50 fictitious computer
entries defrauding the VA of more than $46,000 and during the investigation admitted that he
had earlier defrauded the VA of $30,000); United States v. Coleman, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
14833, at *2 (9th Cir. July 3, 1991) (attempt to defraud the government of $9,469,348 by cashing
fraudulent government check); United States v. Carron, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4838 (9th Cir.
May 20, 1991) (unauthorized computer access using two credit cards); United States v. Lewis,
872 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1989) (embezzled approximately $47,000 from AmeriTrust, a federally
insured bank); United States v. Fernandez, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3590, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
25, 1993) (various computer-related crimes, including accessing a federal-interest computer
without authorization and altering or damaging information).
166. United States v. Rice, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 9562 (4th Cir. May 4, 1992).
167. Id. at *5.
168. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 817
(1991).
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Up to this point Morris' potential liability was limited to unau-
thorized access. However, Morris also wanted to make sure that pro-
grammers at the target sites did not kill the worm. Therefore, he
programmed the worm to duplicate itself every seventh time it deter-
mined that the target computer was already infected. Morris released
the worm onto the Internet where it spread and multiplied; it eventu-
ally caused computers at various educational institutions and military
sites to crash. The federal government convicted Morris under 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5). 169
Ill. THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE AcT AND NONCOMPUTER
CRIMES ON THE INTERNET
The first three offenses of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
have extremely limited, if any, applicability to Internet users in the
business, academic, or personal arena. They are part of the original
act, which Congress intentionally drew with a very narrow scope. The
last three offenses have greater applicability as the scope of the Act
expanded with the 1986 Amendments.
A. Unauthorized Access to National Defense, Foreign
Relations, or Restricted Data
The first offense covers unauthorized access to national defense,
foreign relations, or other restricted data as defined in the Atomic En-
ergy Act. 170 Congress obviously drew this subsection very narrowly.
It covers only information that must be protected for reasons of na-
tional defense, foreign relation, or selected information of the Atomic
Energy Act.
To prevail under this section, the prosecutor must prove unau-
thorized access (or access exceeding authorization) and intent or rea-
son to believe that such information is to be used to the injury of the
United States, or the advantage of any foreign nation. Consequently,
if Internet users access corporate or academic files without authoriza-
tion, this section would not apply unless the prosecutor proved that the
hacker intended (or there was reason to believe) that the information
obtained was to be used to injure the United States or to the advantage
any foreign nation. This subsection provides no protection to com-
mercial, academic, or personally-owned computers unless the com-
puters are used in work regarding national defense, foreign relations,
or the Atomic Energy Act.
169. 928 F.2d at 511.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2104(y); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (1988).
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B. Unauthorized Access to Financial Records
The second offense covers unauthorized access to financial
records of financial institutions, card issuers, or consumer reporting
agencies.171 This section does not cover the financial records of In-
ternet users, which fall outside the current definition of financial
institution.
C. Access Affects Use
The third offense covers access to computer used exclusively by
or for the Government of the United States - where the access and
conduct affects the use of the computer.172 As in the previous section,
the scope of this section is very narrowly drawn. The computer must
belong to a department or agency of the United States, or the computer
must be used by or for the Federal Government.' 73 In United States v.
Morris, an Internet user did affect the operation of Government com-
puters, and this section applied. 74 However, this section does not
cover unauthorized access to files of Internet users who fall outside
this definition, such as corporations, businesses, academic institutions,
and individuals.
D. Computer Fraud
The fourth offense is the first federal computer fraud statute. It
criminalizes accessing a federal interest computer with intent to de-
fraud and obtaining anything of value (other than computer time). A
"federal interest computer" is defined as a computer:
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United
States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively
for such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United
States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects
the use of the financial institution's operation or the Government's
operation of such computer; or
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). Financial institutions, card issuers and consumer reporting
agencies are defined as: an institution with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve, a credit union insured by
the National Credit Union Administration, a home loan bank, an institution under the Farm
Credit System, a broker-dealer registered with the Securities Exchange Commission, the Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corporation, a branch or agency of a foreign bank, or an organization
operating under § 25 or § 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(4).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3).
173. Il
174. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
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(B) which is one of two or more computers used in committing the
offense, not all of which are located in the same state. 175
An Internet user could fall within this section on either prong. How-
ever, it is more likely that the Internet user would fall within the sec-
ond prong.
Many of the computers on the Internet are for government use or
belong to financial institutions. If an Internet user accesses a Federal
interest computer without authorization and with an intent to defraud,
and the user obtains anything of value (other than computer time), the
requirements for the first prong are satisfied. Alternatively, if rout-
ers 17 6 on the Internet are considered Federal interest computers, this
section applies. However, routers typically contain no valuable infor-
mation: all routers do is route messages. Therefore, one would not
access an Internet router with intent to defraud, nor would one obtain
anything of value from a router.
Nonetheless, section (B) of this act could apply. In fact, it could
be presumed that a message sent on the Internet is routed interstate.
Consequently, any use of the Internet is presumptively an interstate
transaction. The intent of this definition was to aid local law enforce-
ment officials when crimes were perpetrated across state lines. Prior
to this change, the local law enforcement officials lost jurisdiction
once the transaction traveled outside the state. However, with this
provision, local law enforcement can enlist the aid of federal law en-
forcement officials who do have jurisdiction over interstate traffic.
What is unclear is if any Internet computer is a federal interest
computer. If it is, then any access without authorization (or exceeding
authorization) that furthers an intended fraud and obtains anything of
value (other than computer time) falls within this section. Even if this
broad definition is applied, however, the only crime covered by this
section is fraud.
E. Alters, Damages, or Destroys Information
The fifth offense covers knowingly or recklessly altering, damag-
ing, or destroying information.'77 Unlike the other subsections, which
refer to a Federal interest computer, this section includes any "com-
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
176. A router in a message-switching system is the portion of a node or exchange that
examines incoming messages, interprets the address information in each message and determines
which of the ongoing links can be used. ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 546. Routers, as used
here, refers to any type of telecommunication device/computer which receives messages and
routes them toward their destination. The term may include not only routers, but gateways,
message switching computers, servers, etc.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
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puter used in interstate commerce or communication." Using this def-
inition, any computer connected to the Internet would fall within the
purview of this section. Since any computer accessing Internet en-
gages in interstate communication, then any intentional access without
authorization which alters, damages, or destroys information falls
within this section. This subsection applies to any instance where the
aggregate loss is greater than $1,000 in any one year or where there
was any alteration or potential alteration to medical records.
F. Trafficking Passwords
The sixth offense deals with trafficking passwords. 178 This sub-
section is not limited to federal interest computers. Therefore, it ap-
plies to any Internet computer, as long as it could be shown that such
trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce, or is used by the
U.S. government.
G. Noncomputer Crimes
Computer crimes, fraud, and password trafficking fall within the
purview of the Act. However, noncomputer crimes do not. For exam-
ple, pedophilia escaped liability under all six offenses:
1) A pedophile does not access national defense data, foreign rela-
tions data or data restricted by the Atomic Energy Act;
2) A pedophile does not access the financial records of a financial
institution, card issuer or consumer reporting agency;
3) A pedophile does not access a computer of a department or
agency of the United States used exclusively for the use of the
Government;
4) A pedophile does not access the Internet with intent to defraud
nor obtains any thing of value;
5) A pedophile does not alter, damage or destroy information;
6) A pedophile does not traffic passwords.
Pedophiles typically are authorized users, using a function for
which they are authorized (e.g., a bulletin board service or e-mail).
Their use, per se, does not go outside the bounds of their authoriza-
tion. Their use of the bulletin boards to stalk victims does not alter,
modify, or destroy data, nor does it perpetrate a fraud resulting in pe-
cuniary loss or theft of property. Therefore, pedophiles, or any crimi-
nal for that matter, can use the Internet to facilitate the perpetration of
any crime - as long as they do not exceed their authorization, obtain
anything of value, or use the Internet as an integral part of a fraud.
178. "Trading or dealing in certain goods ...." BLACK'S LAw DiCTIoNARY 1495 (6th ed.
1990).
1996]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Consequently, Congress (by starting ARPANET, which grew
into the Internet)179 has provided a low-cost and effective means for
pedophiles to lure victims, child pornographers to distribute their ob-
scene material, hatemongers to peddle their tracts, stalkers to locate
their victims, and terrorists to distribute information on how to make
and use explosives. Clearly this was not the intent of Congress.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE ACT TO CRIMINALIZE TORTS
AND NONCOMPUTER CRIMES
Modifying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was proposed
in 1995 by Senator Leahy in the National Information Infrastructure
Protection Act of 1995 (NIIPA).' s0 Unfortunately, the NIIPA never
emerged from the Judiciary Committee.18' Congress apparently pre-
ferred the solution proposed by the Communications Decency Act,'" 2
which has just been found unconstitutional by a three-judge panel. 183
The NIIPA would have extensively modified the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act. It would have included foreign communications. 8 4 It
would have eliminated the duplicative language in subsection (a)(5)185
and added liability for reckless damage.'8 6 It would have added extor-
tion as a seventh offense.' 8 7 Finally, it would have changed subsec-
tion (c), the punishment subsection, to incorporate punishments for the
additional proposed offenses."88
One of the most interesting proposals in the NIIPA was the addi-
tion of language in subsection (c), the punishment section: "[I]f... the
offense was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State." This language can serve as a model for criminalizing use of
the Internet to commit noncomputer crimes. The wording of Senator
Leahy's amendment has several advantages. It allows the current gov-
ernmental agency (city, state or federal government) to continue to
define and prosecute the underlying act. It makes it a federal offense
to use the Internet to perpetrate a crime or tort, which in turns makes
179. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
180. S. 982, 104th Cong.; 1st Sess. (1995).
181. l
182. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230, 303, 330, 559, 640, 641; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465, 2422).
183. ACLU v. Reno, No. 96-963, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7919, at *205 (E.D. Pa. June 11,
1996).
184. S. 982 § 2(1)(B), 104th Cong.; 1st Sess. (1995).
185. 1d§ 2(2)(B).
186. Id§ 2(1)(E).
187. Id.§ 2(1)(F).
188. Id § 2(2).
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federal resources available to state and local governments. It creates
additional penalties and provides the option of having the offender
serve time in federal prison. By implementing this particular provi-
sion, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act would address the current
gap for noncomputer crimes.
The punishments for violation of this section could be fashioned
similar to those of the other offenses. The fine could be "under this
title"; the imprisonment could be set at the maximum of twenty years
to allow the respective governments the optimal flexibility in deter-
mining additional incarceration:
(c)(5) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20
years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(7).
These slight modifications to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
would expand the scope of the Act to include noncomputer crimes.
These modifications limit federal criminal liability to use of the In-
ternet to perpetrate a crime or tort. It leaves to the respective federal,
state, and local governments, the definition and prosecution of the un-
derlying crimes. In addition, it makes only slight modifications to an
existing act which has already undergone thorough review by the De-
partment of Justice - as evidenced by the extensive modifications
made to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in 1986.
CONCLUSION
The dark side of the Internet has grown to a critical mass. It has
detonated a hue and cry that the federal government react to what has
been classified in this comment as noncomputer crimes, i.e., those
crimes, such as pornography and pedophilia, which are not currently
covered by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. While the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act has been amended several times, it still does not
address the perpetration of noncomputer crimes.
Since cyberspace exists everywhere and nowhere at the same
time, it is important that the control for defining and prosecuting
noncomputer crimes remains where it currently resides - at the fed-
eral, state and local level, respectively. If this approach is not taken,
there could be a tremendous federalization of crimes, and the local
community would lose its ability to define and prosecute crimes based
on local standards.
In response to these concerns, an amendment to the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act is proposed. It is based on a proposal by Senator
Leahy in 1995. Punishment should be set at the maximum level to
allow governments maximum flexibility in sentencing.
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Making slight modifications to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, rather than creating new legislation, such as the Communications
Decency Act,189 has several advantages. It will minimize the amount
of statutory analysis required. It will minimize the risk of the statute
being found unconstitutional. It will allow law enforcement agencies
to more quickly set about the task of cracking down on crimes perpe-
trated, or facilitated, by using the Internet.
189. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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